Emerging scenario in Sri Lanka

With an end to Sri Lanka's internal war against the LTTE, the stage is set for Colombo to expand bilateral trade, investment and military ties, especially with India, says G. PARTHASARATHY.

May 2009 saw the end of the three-decade long and bloody ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, in which an estimated 80,000 people perished. The conflict ended when a relentless offensive by Sri Lankan armed forces led to the killing of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and the decimation of his cadres.

While questions remain about the alleged violations of human rights of the Tamil civilian population caught in the crossfire, President Mahinda Rajapakse has emerged as the most popular leader of his country, defeating his rival, former Army chief Sarath Fonseka, in Presidential elections on January 26. This has been followed by a decisive victory of the ruling United People's Freedom Alliance, which secured just over 60 per cent of the votes cast in the Parliamentary elections this month.

President Rajapakse combined a determined war strategy with astute diplomacy, after he concluded that dialogue with the LTTE had failed and that he had to eliminate the Tigers. Faced with pressure brought about by erstwhile mediator Norway, together with the US and the European Union, Rajapakse secured support from India, while simultaneously obtaining arms and economic assistance from China and Pakistan, and economic assistance from Japan.

With the Bush administration deciding to work together with India on regional issues, things turned around for the embattled President after the US started to adopt a more understanding approach. Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan Government effectively resisted European pressures to halt military operations.

The successful conclusion of the ethnic conflict laid to rest all doubts in Sri Lanka about India's commitment to its unity and territorial integrity. The once-powerful Sinhala chauvinist, pseudo-Marxist and anti-Indian Janatha Vimuktha Perumana (JVP) was mauled in this month's Parliamentary elections.

REHABILITATION OF TAMILS

The end of the ethnic conflict was accompanied by the displacement of 300,000 Tamil civilians. New Delhi's primary concern in recent months has naturally been on rehabilitation of internally displaced Tamils. With an investment of $110 million, India has provided emergency supplies of medicines, temporary housing and cement for constructing houses.

It has undertaken de-mining of Tamil habitats located in the battle zone. But, this is necessarily only a beginning, in a larger package of assistance that New Delhi has to provide to the Tamil population in the war-affected parts of the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.

With plans under way to have an Indian cultural centre and renovate the famous Duraiappan Stadium in Jaffna, India would have to invest substantially in building higher educational and technical training institutions in Tamil areas to enable the Tamil population to integrate into an emerging pluralistic and economically dynamic Sri Lanka. Politically, President Rajapakse should be persuaded to implement the provisions of the 13th Amendment of the Sri Lanka Constitution enacted in 1988, pursuant to the Rajiv Gandhi-Jayawardene Agreement of 1987.

Moreover, if a return to a situation of Tamil discontent fuelling insurgency is to be avoided, it would only be wise for Sri Lanka to also enact legislation to implement the provisions of the “Constitution of the Republic of Sri Lanka Amendment Bill” of August 3, 2000, and effectively end the human rights violations of innocent Tamils.

This Bill was presented after extensive consultations by President Kumaratunga's advisers, G.L. Peiris and Neelan Tiruchelvan, and was withdrawn because of domestic opposition. The implementation of this Bill, together with the 1988 Constitutional Amendment, will largely address Tamil concerns and aspirations. But, at the same time, the Tamils of Sri Lanka would have to recognise that with the East becoming different from the North in terms of its ethnic composition, demands for a united north-eastern province may not longer be tenable.

CONCERNS OVER CHINA

Concerns naturally exist in India about growing Chinese involvement in Sri Lanka and especially its partnership in the development of the Hambantota Port. This port, being built with a concessionary Chinese loan of $300 million, will eventually have a LNG facility, fuel storage facilities, three separate docks, together with facilities for ship repair and construction. It can serve as a base for bunkering and refuelling.

Moreover, China has been the largest supplier of military equipment to Sri Lanka in recent years and is involved in projects for the construction of highways, railways and a coal-based power plant. China's trade with Sri Lanka has doubled in the last five years to $1.13 billion in 2009.

Given the Chinese desire to increase its maritime presence in the Indian Ocean, including in South Asia, while working through Pakistan, New Delhi will have to make it clear to Sri Lanka that any facilities provided to China, in the context of its overall policies of encircling and containing India, would not be welcome.

COMMERCIAL TIES

However, it does appear that Sri Lanka has no intention of causing undue concern to India. In fact, before approaching China for the development of the Hambantota Port, Sri Lanka had asked India to undertake the project and approached China only after it did not receive a positive response from India. When blocks for oil exploration were parcelled out in the Gulf of Mannar, the Sri Lankan Government gave equal opportunities and benefits to both India and China, allocating one block each, to both countries.

Moreover, with bilateral trade reaching $2.02 billion in 2009, Sri Lanka is today India's largest trading partner in SAARC. India, in turn, should be more forthcoming in opening its markets to exports of tea, spices, rubber and textiles by Sri Lanka.

India has extended Lines of Credit amounting to $592 million to Sri Lanka for upgrading the Colombo-Matara rail link, the supply of railway equipment and construction of rail lines in northern Sri Lanka. Proposals are under consideration for interconnection of the grids in Sri Lanka and India. But New Delhi would do well to ensure that negotiations are finalised for constructing a 500 MW power plant in Trincomalee. With an over 90 per cent rate of literacy and life expectancy of females reaching 76 years, Sri Lanka has a far better record in human development than India.

Moreover, despite a raging civil war, the island has shown a remarkable growth rate, averaging 6.3 per cent since 2003. Unlike some of India's other neighbours, the Sri Lankans have shown a readiness to integrate their economy with the economies of neighbouring southern Indian States.

Major Indian companies such as IOC, Tatas, Bharti Airtel, Ashok Leyland, Larsen and Toubro and Taj Hotels already have a presence in the island. Projects involving Indian private investment of around $500 million have been approved for implementation in Sri Lanka. Cricketing ties and religious and cultural affinities have promoted what is a natural and mutually beneficial partnership.

With the ethnic conflict over, there should now be fewer inhibitions on expanding bilateral military ties. In this otherwise optimistic scenario, one hopes that with a massive mandate, President Rajapakse will show statesmanship and magnanimity in addressing the legitimate aspirations of the island's alienated Tamil population.

Sri Lanka needs political solution
The euphoria and propaganda over the military victory is worrying, since the real problem that needs to be addressed is the ethnic issue and the sense of alienation felt by the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, says RASHEEDA BHAGAT.

Celebrating the fall of Kilinochchi…Military victories cannot resolve political problems

In a world that has developed zero tolerance for conflicts with a terrorist element, it is easy to see why the Sri Lankan military offensive against the Tamil Tigers is looked at with admiration. This is also the reason why Israel has been allowed to get away, so far, with the slaughter of innocent civilians in Gaza.

The Sri Lanka story is, of course, different. Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination by the LTTE meant the end of support for the terrorist group in most of India, barring some sections in Tamil Nadu. With a Congress-led coalition government at the Centre, support to the extremist group, even in Tamil Nadu — as the Sri Lankan military offensive against it gathered force — has been muted and confined to raising concerns over the plight of the Tamil civilians.

After the fall of the LTTE bastion of Kilinochchi last week, the Sri Lankan President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, claimed in an interview to The Hindu (January 5), that as the offensive raged in the Tamil Tiger stronghold, his government had given the “highest priority to civilian safety” and armed forces had succeeded in maintaining a “zero civilian casualty policy”.

While in much of the world, fed up with suicide bombings and terror attacks, there were not many to shed tears over the LTTE’s plight, in Colombo and elsewhere in the south of Sri Lanka, there was jubilation and many Sinhalese came out on the streets to burst firecrackers to celebrate the fall of Kilinochchi.

Where is the solution?

The government propaganda machinery did its utmost to tell Sri Lankans that long years of battle with the LTTE was nearing an end. But it is exactly this kind of euphoria and propaganda that is worrying political analysts and peace activists in Sri Lanka. These people look upon the military offensive and its results as a short-lived triumph that will do nothing to address the real problem, which is the ethnic issue and the sense of alienation felt by the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka.

Refusing to be carried away by the sense of triumph and euphoria evident in the Sri Lankan government circles, Prof Jayadeva Uyangoda, a Colombo-based political analyst, says the Rajapaksa government needs to make a distinct difference between “military gains and finding a lasting solution to Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. At the moment, the government is triumphant, but they have to politically address the issue of political rights of the Tamils. That is the real challenge, and not the military gains.”

While the military offensive rages, the short-term challenge is to ensure the safety of the civilian population, “but the long term challenge is to find a political solution. The issue that has to be addressed is the ethnic conflict but, unfortunately, this government has looked at it as a military triumph. The political management of the ethnic conflict is very important, and we have to remember that the ethnic conflict is a conflict for equality.”

Prof Uyangoda says that in the euphoria of the moment many people “seem to have forgotten that military victories don’t resolve political problems; so instead of congratulating ourselves on our military victory, we have to constantly remind people that a military victory can only be a partial victory, which may or may not last. What will last is a political solution.” He points out that the hardline JVP, “a very important and powerful ally of President Rajapaksa, has today come out with a statement opposing the devolution of power to the Tamil people.

Asked to comment on the mood on Colombo’s streets, he said the Sinhalese majority “are very happy, and unfortunately the government propaganda machinery creates an impression that this is a Sinhalese victory over the Tamils. This is the feeling you get when you hear the Government radio. It’s not only incorrect, but also dangerous, to give the impression that this is a Sinhalese victory over the Tamils. Let’s not forget that Sri Lanka is a country that belongs to all communities and its only when the majority as well as minority community feel equal, that we can find peace.”

Elusive peace

Dr Jehan Perera, Executive Director, National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, agrees that the euphoria created by the military gains was uncalled for. “This has created a lot of optimism that an end to the war and peace are around the corner. But if you look at what has happened in the past, this is unlikely to be the case.”

He points out that in 1995 too the government had captured Jaffna which was then the LTTE’s administrative headquarters. “And yet the war did not end. This time, even if the government forces do take over more territory, the LTTE will still remain a guerrilla force and will continue to be nurtured by the Tamil diaspora.”

Dr Perera argues that the real problem in grappling with Sri Lanka’s ethnic problem was that in the “mind of most people — even the Sri Lankan government — the LTTE aspect has overshadowed the ethnic conflict. So they think that by getting rid of the LTTE the problem will be over. But even if you do manage to get rid of the LTTE, you get back to square one… when in 1957, Prime Minister Bandaranayake and Tamil leader Selvanathan tried to reach an agreement.”

He believes it is wishful thinking to surmise that the LTTE will simply vanish; even if it is given a huge military blow, “the LTTE will not suddenly collapse and disappear. It will remain, at least for some time to come, as a guerrilla force and capable of carrying out terrorist attacks. It is an organisation which has been in existence for over 30 years, it has a very good internal structure and even if its leadership is taken out, which may happen, it will still be capable of creating a lot of problems.” Also, the core of the problem of the ethnic conflict was yet to be addressed; “the best that the Government has been able to come up with is a Sinhala version of the solution, which can’t be acceptable to the Tamils. So there lies the crucial problem.”

Another factor that people like Dr Perera find disturbing is the kind of spin given to the “victory” against the LTTE. “Even though the Tamil people are exhausted and want an end to the war, they are feeling very bitter and humiliated inside. They see the celebrations in Sri Lanka, the lighting of firecrackers when Kilinochchi fell, when the Sri Lankan flag was hoisted and the LTTE flag removed, as anti-Tamil.”

Even though his close questioning of many Sinhala people showed that they saw the military victory as a “victory against the LTTE and not against the Sri Lankan Tamils, the Tamils too have a very jaundiced perception of the Sinhalese. They think the Sinhalese people want to humiliate them. Of course, the President has said in his speech that don’t see this as a victory of the South over the North, it is the victory for all Sri Lankans, and I will look after all my people, for the Tamils, these are only empty words. They don’t believe a word of what the President says because the conduct of the Government towards the Tamils has been atrocious.”

Giving an example, Dr Perera says “The Tamils have to register at police stations and are treated as a separate group… an outcast and a suspect group. When the Tamils see a check point they are frightened. Even I, if am going with a Tamil in my vehicle, am a little frightened not because they will arrest me, because they might arrest my friend and I will get held up, and will have to go through a process to get him out, etc. so I can imagine the fear of a Tamil in Colombo.”

On the challenge before the Sri Lankan government, he says the President, who has now entrusted the task of finding a solution to the All Party Representative Committee led by Minister Tissa Vitarane, would have to step in and assume leadership, instead of hoping that any such committee, which was filled with “many hardliners and extremists who are dragging their feet”, could throw up a solution.

“Till that is done, any military gains against the LTTE will only mean the removal of the symptom, not the problem,” he warns.